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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
GLEN C. WEISER, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, Appellate Case No. 20080124-SC 
(District Court No. 910749302PR) 
vs. 
Nature of Proceeding: Appeal 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD 
COMPANY, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Defendant/Appellee, Union Pacific Railroad Company ("Union Pacific"), 
respectfully submits this brief in answer to the opening brief of Plaintiff/Appellant, Glen 
C. Weiser ("Weiser"). 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(j), which 
gives the Court of Appeals jurisdiction over appeals transferred from the Supreme Court. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
16 Stat. 395, December 15,1870 5,8,12,19 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
In this case, the parties dispute ownership of a tract of land in Davis County, Utah. A 
portion of the property falls within the limits of a December 15, 1870, Act of Congress 
right-of-way grant to Utah Central Railroad Company ("Utah Central"), Union Pacific's 
predecessor-in-interest. R. 2944 at 2-3. Weiser's predecessor-in-interest, George 
Tomlinson, received a patent to the property on September 25, 1873. R. 4-5. Weiser 
alleges that he is the sole owner of the property. He brought this action for declaratory 
relief, ejectment, and damages. R. 4-12. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
Weiser filed a Verified Complaint on January 31, 1991, in which he raised claims 
for forcible detainer, trespass, unjust enrichment, restitution of premises, declaratory 
relief, and special damages. R. 1-15. On October 5, 1992, Weiser moved for partial 
summary judgment, seeking a ruling that he held title to the property and that Union 
Pacific had no interest. R. 136-140, 197-218. In its opposition to Weiser's motion, Union 
Pacific argued that it held a fee interest in the property by virtue of the 1870 Act of 
Congress right-of-way grant to Utah Central that defeated Weiser's interest in the 
property. R. 297-98, 299-312. The trial court heard argument and ruled in favor of 
2 
Weiser, finding that Utah Central did not receive the benefit of the right-of-way grant 
because it did not file a profile map with the Secretary of the Interior by the deadline set 
in the Act. R. 639-48, 823-34. 
The trial court certified the partial summary judgment as final pursuant to Rule 
54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Union Pacific appealed. R. 836-37, 840. 
After oral argument, the Utah Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction, holding that the order appealed from was not properly certifiable, and 
proceedings in the trial court resumed. R. 911-12. 
On October 20, 2000, Union Pacific sought reconsideration of the trial court's 
ruling that Union Pacific held no interest in the property because Utah Central did not 
timely submit a profile map. R. 1315-27. Weiser opposed the motion. R. 1450-70. The 
trial court heard argument and granted Union Pacific's motion on October 1, 2001. R. 
1498-1514. 
Relying on United States v. Northern Pacific Railroad Co., 177 U.S. 435 (1900), 
the trial court ruled that the "lapse of a Land Grant statute before the filing of a profile 
map only authorizes the federal government to seek forfeiture of the railroad Land 
Grant." R. 1511. The federal government never sought forfeiture of the grant to Utah 
Central. Therefore, the trial court ruled, "the federal government, regardless of Utah 
Central Railroad's late filing, accepted the profile map as a timely acceptance of the Land 
Grant." R. 1511. Ultimately, the trial court ruled that, "[b]ecause the disputed Property is 
3 
included within the Land Grant's right of way, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has no 
valid claim to the Property." R. 1512. 
After the trial court's ruling, the parties resolved the remaining issues in the case, 
which related to the portion of the property that fell outside the railroad right-of-way. 
The trial court entered final judgment on December 21, 2007, R. 2903-2913, and this 
appeal followed. R. 2914. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On May 17, 1869, Utah Central began construction of a railroad line from Ogden 
to Salt Lake City in the Utah Territory. R. 322. Utah Central completed construction of 
the railroad line on January 10, 1870. R. 322. 
Almost a year after construction was complete, on December 15, 1870, Congress 
passed an Act "granting to the Utah Central Railroad Company a right of way through the 
public lands for the construction of a railroad and telegraph." 16 Stat. 395 (attached as 
Add. A). The Act granted the Utah Central a 400-foot wide right-of-way for its already 
constructed railroad line: 
Said way is granted to said railroad to the extent of two 
hundred feet in width on each side of said railroad where it 
may pass through the public domain, including all necessary 
ground for station-buildings, work-shops, depots, machine-
shops, switches, side-tracks, turn-tables, and water-stations[.] 
Id. 
Utah Central was required to file a map showing the location of its railroad line: 
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[W]ithin three months from the passage of this Act the said 
Utah Central Railroad Company shall file with the Secretary 
of the Interior a map to be approved by him, exhibiting the 
line of the railroad of said company, as the same has been 
located and constructed[.] 
Id 
The Act further required Utah Central to confirm its acceptance of the terms and 
conditions of the Act: 
[T]he acceptance of the terms, conditions, and impositions of 
this act, by the said Utah Central Railroad Company, shall be 
signified in writing under the corporate seal of said company, 
duly executed pursuant to the direction of its board of 
directors first had and obtained, which acceptance shall be 
made within three months after the passage of this act, and 
shall be served on the President of the United States; and if 
such acceptance and service shall not be so made, this grant 
shall be void. 
Id § 4. 
Accordingly, Utah Central transmitted its acceptance of the terms of the Act to 
President Ulysses S. Grant on March 2, 1871. R. 322, 328. President Grant, in turn, 
transmitted Utah Central's acceptance to the Secretary of the Interior, Columbus Delano, 
on March 4, 1871, R. 341, who received it on March 9, 1871. R. 322, 327. 
On March 6, 1871, four days after sending its acceptance of the terms of the Act to 
President Grant, Utah Central transmitted to Secretary Delano a profile map showing the 
already-constructed railroad line. R. 322, 325-26. Secretary Delano received the map on 
March 7, 1871. R. 322, 325. Although the Act did not require the profile map to be 
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certified, the Secretary returned the map to Utah Central on March 8, 1871, advising Utah 
Central that the "map was not certified and could not be accepted." R. 325. 
Twenty-one days later, on March 29, 1871, the Department of the Interior (the 
"Department") received a certified profile map from Utah Central. R. 339. The next day, 
the Department notified Utah Central that it had accepted the certified profile map. R. 
339. On June 26, 1871, the Department sent Utah Central a Certificate of Filing of 
Acceptance of Map. R. 325. 
More than two years later, on September 25, 1873, George Tomlinson, Weiser's 
predecessor-in-interest, received a patent from the United States purporting to patent a 
section of Utah Central's right-of-way. R. 3-4. The property is located in present-day 
Davis County, near the Salt Lake/Davis County line. R. 314-17. 
In 2001, the Utah Legislature passed a bill appropriating funds to the Utah 
Department of Transportation ("UDOT") to be used by the Utah Transit Authority 
("UTA") to purchase a commuter rail corridor from Union Pacific. R. 2207-08, 2256-57. 
The sale contemplated by the Legislature closed on September 20, 2002, and the disputed 
property was conveyed to UTA as part of the sale. R. 2257. 
The railroad line built by Utah Central has been in continuous operation since 
construction was completed in 1870. It formed a part of the nation's trans-continental 
railroad system, and is now in use as a commuter rail corridor. On January 23, 1991, 
Weiser sued Union Pacific seeking to quiet title to the disputed property. R. 1-15. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
This appeal raises the question whether an 1870 Act of Congress right-of-way 
grant gave Union Pacific's predecessor, Utah Central, title to the disputed property 
superior to George Tomlinson's patent. This question arises out of events that occurred 
in the Utah Territory in 1868 to 1871 and that play a small, local part in "a fascinating 
chapter in our history." Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 669 (1979). 
Like many right-of-way grants to railroads passed by Congress before 1871, the 
Act of December 15, 1870, gave Utah Central the land on which the railroad was located. 
See Great N. Ry. Co. v. United States, 315 U.S. 262, 274 (1942). Although, beginning in 
1871, Congress was much more likely to grant an easement to a railroad for its right-of-
way, earlier grants, including the grant to Utah Central, were "of a limited fee, made on 
an implied condition of reverter in the event that the company ceased to use or retain the 
land for the purpose for which it was granted."1 Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Townsend, 190 
U.S. 267, 271 (1903). 
1
 Weiser points out that the 1870 Act says "the right of way" and not "a right of way," 
and argues that the difference largely determines the nature of Utah Central's interest. 
Op. Br. at 37. He relies on the Great Northern Railway case to support his argument 
that the 1870 right-of-way grant gave Utah Central an easement only. That case traces the 
historical evolution of railroad land grants and supports Union Pacific's argument. E.g., 
315 U.S. at 273 ("After 1871, outright grants of public lands to private railroad companies 
seem to have been discontinued." (emphasis added)). 
This Court has noted that "a railroad right-of-way is a creature that occupies a 
unique place among property interests somewhere between traditional easements and fee 
interests . . . . " Elder v. Nephi City, 2007 UT % 8 n.3, 164 P.3d 1238. Thus, even if the 
1870 Act is construed as granting an easement only, an easement acquired by a railroad 
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Utah Central received all of the property up to 200 feet on either side of the track, 
measured from the center line, along the route from Ogden to Salt Lake City. The 1870 
right-of-way grant to Utah Central is an example of "our nation's historical practice of 
making generous grants of property interests to railroad companies to induce them to 
tame the western frontier with the steel conduit of civilization." Elder v. Nephi City, 
2007 UT 46,1f 7, 164 P.3d 1238. "The grant was not a mere gift to the Utah Central 
Railroad Company, but was designed to promote the interests of the inhabitants of the two 
cities [Ogden and Salt Lake City], of the public at large, and of the general government, 
as well as those of the grantee." Moon v. Salt Lake County, 76 P. 222, 225 (Utah 1904). 
The Act states "[t]hat the right of way through the public lands be, and the same is 
hereby, granted[.]" 16 Stat. 395 (attached as Add. A). These words "import a grant in 
praesenti and not one infuturo, of the promise of a grant." Missouri, Kans. & Tex. Ry., 
97 U.S. at 496; accord Van Wyckv. Knevals, 106 U.S. 360, 365 (1882). In other words, 
the Act "passed to the company a present interest in the lands to be designated within the 
limits there specified." Missouri, Kans. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. Kansas Pac. Ry. Co., 97 U.S. 
491, 496 (1878) (construing July 1, 1862, Congressional grant to Leavenworth, Pawnee, 
& W. R. Co.). 
company "'requires for its enjoyment a use of the land permanent in its nature and 
practically exclusive . . . so that ordinarily the fee is of little or no value unless the land is 
underlaid by a quarry or a mine.'" New Mexico v. United States Trust Co., 172 U.S. 171, 
183 (1898) (citation omitted). 
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Accordingly, only claims established before December 15, 1870, "overrode the 
railroad grant; conflicting claims arising after that time could not be given effect." Leo 
Sheep, 440 U.S. at 679 (construing 1862 Congressional grant to Union Pacific). The trial 
court granted partial summary judgment for Union Pacific, ruling that Weiser's claim to 
the property could not be given effect because it arose after the date of the Act. This 
Court should affirm the ruling of the trial court for the following reasons: 
First, Weiser failed to preserve the argument that the date of his predecessor-in-
interest's first declaratory statement under the Pre-emption Act establishes his priority 
date. Accordingly, this Court should decline to address the argument. 
Second, the date of Weiser's predecessor-in-interest's first declaratory statement 
does not determine Weiser's priority in any event. The 1870 Congressional grant to Utah 
Central was of a right-of-way only. It did not include a grant of "checkerboard" sections 
of land adjacent to the right-of-way. United States Supreme Court precedent 
distinguishes between these two types of railroad land grants and holds, consistent with 
the plain language of the acts, that a right-of-way grant is unqualified. Consequently, a 
right-of-way grant can be defeated by a pre-emption claimant only if the pre-emption 
claimant has paid the full purchase price prior to passage of the right-of-way grant. The 
filing of a declaratory statement alone is insufficient. 
Third, title to the disputed property passed to Utah Central on the date the Act, 
December 15, 1870. The Secretary of the Interior found that Utah Central had complied 
with the requirements of the Act. Even if Utah Central had not complied, only the United 
9_ 
States could seek forfeiture. The United States did not do so, and Weiser does not have 
standing to contest Utah Central's compliance. Further, the validity and effectiveness of 
the right-of-way grant to Utah Central has been affirmed twice by the Utah Supreme 
Court and once by the United States Supreme Court. 
Fourth, because the right-of-way grant to Utah Central was valid and effective as 
of the date of the Act, and because Weiser's predecessor-in-interest had not acquired a 
vested interest in the disputed property before the date of the Act, all of Weiser's claims 
based on state law were properly dismissed by the trial court. State law cannot operate to 
impair a Congressional right-of-way grant. 
Finally, the sale of the disputed property to UTA did not effect a reversion to the 
United States. Union Pacific sold the property pursuant to a federal statute that permits a 
railroad to sell lands within its right-of-way to a state department of transportation or its 
nominee. The sale was proper and Weiser does not have standing to challenge it. 
For these reasons, the trial court properly granted partial summary judgment in 
favor of Union Pacific and its judgment should be affirmed. 
10 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO CONSIDER THE EFFECT OF THE FILING OF A 
DECLARATORY STATEMENT UNDER THE PRE-EMPTION ACT BECAUSE WEISER 
FAILED TO PRESERVE IT 
The declaratory statement issue was not preserved below, and this Court should 
decline to address it. Weiser proffered evidence in the trial court that his predecessor-in-
interest, Tomlinson, filed two declaratory statements, one before the December 15, 1870, 
right-of-way grant was passed, and one after.2 R. 2945 at 25, 2468. However, Weiser 
never argued to the trial court, either in connection with the proffer or at any other time, 
that the date of the first declaratory statement should be used to determine priority. As a 
result, Union Pacific did not have an opportunity to address this argument in the trial 
court. 
In his opening brief, Weiser offers three record citations to demonstrate that the 
declaratory statement issue was raised below. However, in each instance, the cited 
portion of the record is a court order rather than a document in which Weiser might have 
raised the issue or cited relevant case law. Op. Br. at 1 (citing R. 1515-29, Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Summary Judgment (attached as Add. B); R. 2390-91, 
Ruling on Motions for Summary Judgment Filed by the Parties (attached as Add. C); and 
2
 For this reason, if this Court rules that the declaratory statement date establishes priority, 
the case should be remanded so that the trial court can determine which of Tomlinson's 
two declaratory statement dates should be used. 
11 
R. 2909, Revised Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order and Judgment 
(attached as Add. D)). 
The only mention of the declaratory statement issue in any of the cited orders is the 
following quote from the Revised Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order and 
Judgment: "Weiser contended that Tomlinson's interest in the property was superior to 
the Railroad's because Tomlinson presented his Declaratory Statement of Pre-emption on 
April 17, 1869 before the Conditional Grant was approved by Congress and therefore the 
Property was not part of the 'public lands' at the time Congress approved the Conditional 
Grant." R. 2909 (attached as Add. D) (emphasis in original). 
However, in the December 8, 2005, bench trial, Weiser proffered evidence 
concerning Tomlinson's efforts to comply with pre-emption requirements but did not 
inform the court or counsel for Union Pacific that he believed that case law supported the 
conclusion that the date of Tomlinson's declaratory statement was the operative date for 
purposes of establishing priority. Instead, his comments were more general, and did not 
specifically raise the issue. Counsel for Weiser stated: "[W]e'd like an opportunity to file 
a motion with the Court setting forth the points and authorities that—and the legal 
research that we have gathered with respect to the preemption issue." R. 3025. The trial 
court was not receptive to reconsidering its prior ruling on priority but stated, "I have no 
objection to your doing that." R. 3026. Nevertheless, Weiser never filed a motion or any 
other paper setting forth points and authorities with respect to the declaratory statement 
issue, until his filings in this appeal. 
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""'[T]o preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must first raise the issue in 
the trial court/' giving that court an opportunity to rule on the issue.'" Searle v. Searle, 
2001 UT App 367, ^ 179 38 P.3d 307 (citations omitted, alteration in original). "'[T]he 
issue must be specifically raised'" and "a party must introduce 'supporting evidence or 
relevant legal authority.'" Id. (citations in original). This Court will address only legal 
arguments that were raised in the district court. Sweet v. Sweet,, 2006 UT App 216, | 5 
n.2, 138 P.3d 63; Ingram v. Salt Lake City, 733 P.2d 126, 127 (Utah 1987). 
Weiser argues on appeal that the trial court erred when it failed to apply 
controlling law. Op. Br. at 4, 24-25, 31-32. Yet Weiser neglected to bring that law to the 
attention of the trial court. As a result, the trial court did not rule on the issue. The 
declaratory statement issue was not preserved for appeal and this Court should decline to 
address it. 
Even if Weiser had preserved the declaratory statement issue for appeal, however, 
the argument fails because it is based on a misunderstanding of case law construing 
railroad land grants. In the event that this Court decides to address the issue, an analysis 
follows. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT UNION PACIFIC'S 
INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY IS SUPERIOR TO WEISER'S 
A Lands to which pre-emption claims had attached were not excluded 
from Utah Central's right-of-way grant 
The 1870 right-of-way grant to Utah Central did not except lands to which pre-
emption or homestead rights had "attached." The grant to Utah Central simply provided: 
That the right of way through the public lands be, and the 
same is hereby, granted to the Utah Central Railroad 
Company . . . and the right, power, and authority is hereby 
given to said corporation to take from the public lands 
adjacent to the line of said road material of earth, stone, 
timber, and so forth, for the construction thereof. Said way is 
granted to said railroad to the extent of two hundred feet in 
width on each side of said railroad where it may pass through 
the public domain, including all necessary ground for station-
buildings, work-shops, depots, machine-shops, switches, side-
tracks, turn-tables, and water-stations[.] 
16 Stat. 395 (attached as Add. A). Like other right-of-way grants to railroads, the grant to 
Utah Central contained no exceptions or exclusions. 
However, in addition to a right-of-way grant, such as the grant to Utah Central, 
Congress gave some railroads "checkerboard sections" of property adjacent to the railroad 
line that could be sold to help finance construction. These land grants often contained 
limiting language, excepting from the grant any lands to which pre-emption or homestead 
rights had "attached." For example, on July 1, 1862, Congress made the following grant 
to the Central Pacific: 
"That there be, and is hereby, granted to the said company, for 
the purpose of aiding in the construction of said railroad and 
telegraph line, and to secure the safe and speedy 
14 
transportation of the mails, troops, munitions of war, and 
public stores thereon, every alternate section of public land, 
designated by odd numbers, to the amount of five alternate 
sections per mile on each side of said railroad, on the line 
thereof, and within the limits often miles on each side of said 
road, not sold, reserved, or otherwise disposed of by the 
United States, and to which a pre-emption or homestead claim 
may not have attached, at the time the line of said road is 
definitely fixed." 
Tarpey v. Madsen, 53 P. 996, 997 (Utah 1898) (quoting 12 Stat. 492 (emphasis added)). 
The character of the grant to Utah Central is determinative of the issue of priority 
in this case. The United States Supreme Court long ago held that: 
the grant of the right of way differed from the grant of alternate 
odd-numbered sections in that, while both were expressed in the 
words of a grant inpraesenti, the former was without limitation 
or exception, while the latter was expressly made subject to the 
limitation or exception that it should not include any lands 
which, although public at the date of the grant, were sold, 
reserved, or otherwise disposed of by the United States, or to 
which a preemption or homestead claim had attached, at the date 
of definite location. 
Stuart v. Union Pac. R. Co., 227 U.S. 342, 353 (1913); accord Nielsen v. Northern Pac. R. 
Co., 184 F. 601, 602 (9th Cir. 1911). 
The United States Supreme Court explained the policy served by the limitations 
placed on grants of "checkerboard" sections: 
The sections granted could be ascertained only when the routes 
were definitely located. This might take years, the time 
depending somewhat upon the length of the proposed road and 
the difficulties of ascertaining the most favorable route. It was 
not for the interest of the country that in the mean time any 
portions of the public lands should be withheld from settlement 
or use because they might, perhaps, when the route was 
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surveyed, fall within the limits of a grant. Congress, therefore, 
adopted the policy of keeping the public lands open to 
occupation and pre-emption, and appropriation to public uses, 
notwithstanding any grant it might make, until the lands granted 
were ascertained, and providing that if any sections settled upon 
or reserved were then found to fall within the limits of the grant, 
other land in their place should be selected. Thus, settlements 
on the public lands were encouraged without the aid intended for 
the construction of the roads being thereby impaired. 
Railroad Co. v. Baldwin, 103 U.S. 426, 429 (1880). 
However, grants of rights-of-way only needed no qualification because "lands would 
not be the less valuable for settlement by a road running through them. On the contrary, 
their value would be greatly enhanced thereby." Id. at 430. Further, a "right of way for the 
whole distance of the proposed route was a very important part of the aid given" in the right-
of-way grants. Id. If a railroad company were 
compelled to purchase its way over any section that might be 
occupied in advance of its location, very serious obstacles would 
be often imposed to the progress of the road. For any loss of 
lands by settlement or reservation, other lands are given; but for 
the loss of the right of way by these means, no compensation is 
provided, nor could any be given by the substitution of another 
route. 
Id 
In his opening brief, Weiser relies on cases construing the language of the 
qualified grant of "checkerboard" sections to the Central Pacific Railroad under a July 1, 
1862, Act of Congress, 12 Stat. 489. Op. Br. at 28-31 (citing Tarpey v. Madsen, 178 U.S. 
215 (1900); Whitney v. Taylor, 158 U.S. 85 (1895)). Those cases interpreted the term 
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"attached" as used in the qualified land grant to mean something less than "perfected."3 
Specifically, case law held that, where the exception applied, a pre-emption claim 
"attached" when a declaratory statement was filed. Contrary to Weiser's argument, Op. 
Br. at 4-5, this did not perfect a pre-emption claim. It merely began the process. 
Nevertheless, the interests of would-be pre-emptioners who had filed declaratory 
statements were preserved by excluding their claims from the "checkerboard" sections 
granted to the Central Pacific. 
By contrast, right-of-way grants, including the right-of-way grant to Utah Central, 
did not contain the term "attached," nor did they provide for any exceptions or exclusions. 
The United States Supreme Court held that, "[h]ad a similar qualification upon the 
absolute grant of the right of way been intended, it can hardly be doubted that it would 
have been expressed. The fact that none is expressed is conclusive that none exists." 
Stuart, 227 U.S. at 353; accord Reno v. Southern Pac. Co., 268 F. 751, 756 (9th Cir. 
1920). 
Weiser relies upon cases that interpret the exclusion of lands to which a pre-
emption claim had "attached." These cases are not relevant to the interpretation of the 
unqualified right-of-way grant to the Utah Central at issue in this case. Instead, the 
effectiveness of Tomlinson's pre-emption claim as against Utah Central's right-of-way 
3
 This is consistent with the language of the land grant acts, which distinguished between 
lands that had been "sold, reserved, or otherwise disposed of by the United States," on the 
one hand, and lands "to which a pre-emption or homestead claim mav not have attached" 
on the other. See, e.g., 12 Stat. 492 (emphasis added). 
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grant is governed by the many cases specifically construing unqualified right-of-way 
grants. 
B. Utah Central had superior title because Weiser had not paid the full 
purchase price for his pre-emption claim when the right-of-way Act 
was passed 
Tomlinson took subject to the railroad's right-of-way because he had not yet paid 
the full purchase price for his claim prior to the date of the right-of-way grant. "[U]nder 
the general laws of the United States, one who, having made an entry, is in actual 
occupation under the preemption or homestead law, cannot be dispossessed of his priority 
at the instance of any individual" Union Pac. R. Co. v. Harris, 215 U.S. 386, 389 (1910) 
(emphasis added). However, "the power of Congress over lands which an individual is 
seeking to acquire under either the pre-emption or the homestead law remains until the 
payment of the full purchase price required by the former law or the full occupation 
prescribed by the latter[.]" Id; Northern Pac. Co. v. Smith, 111 U.S. 260, 269 (1898) 
(only vested rights limit power of Congress over public lands and vested rights are 
obtained only when purchase money has been paid and receipt of proper land officer 
given to purchaser); Buxton v. Traver, 130 U.S. 232, 236 (1889) (same); see Reno, 268 F. 
at 761 ("'public lands' . . . are such lands as remained with the government for ultimate 
disposition, lands to which the government had not already parted with the fee"). 
In Pender v. Board of Education, this Court noted the United States Supreme 
Court's characterization of the pre-emption statutes as "an offer by the government 
conditioned upon filing a declaratory statement and performing certain other acts. 
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Unless these conditions are met, there is no acceptance of the offer and no rights arise in 
favor of the settler." 296 P.2d 975, 977 (Utah 1956) (emphasis added). '"When these 
prerequisites were complied with, the settler for the first time acquired a vested right in 
the premises of which he could not be subsequently deprived.'" Id. (quoting Gonzales v. 
French, 164 U.S. 338 (1896)). As the United States Supreme Court held in Emblem v. 
Lincoln Land Co., "the rights of a claimant are to be measured by the acts of Congress, 
and if they show 'that he acquired no vested interest in the land, then, as his rights are 
created by the statutes, they must be governed by their provisions, whether they be hard or 
lenient.'" 184 U.S. 660, 664 (1902) (quoting Frisbie v. Whitney, 76 U.S. 187 (1869)). 
Because the grant to Utah Central was an unqualified right-of-way grant rather 
than a qualified grant of "checkerboard" sections, priority is determined by the date on 
which the pre-emption claimant paid the full purchase price of his claim and received a 
receipt from the land office.4 Only if these events occurred before the date of the right-
of-way grant could Weiser's interest be superior to Union Pacific's. Weiser's proffered 
evidence suggests that Tomlinson made cash entry and obtained a purchase receipt on 
4
 To the extent that this rule of law differs materially from the trial court's reliance on 
patent date as the reference date for establishing priority, the trial court's ruling "'is 
sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even though such 
ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be the basis of its ruling or 
action, and this is true even though such ground or theory is not urged or argued on 
appeal by appellee, was not raised in the lower court, and was not considered or passed 
on by the lower court'" Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61 \ 18, 29 P.3d 1225 (emphasis in 
original) (quoting Limb v. Federated Milk Producers Ass'n, 461 P.2d 290, 293 n.2 
(1969)). 
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February 6, 1872, over one year after Congress passed the right-of-way grant to Utah 
Central.5 Accordingly, Tomlinson took subject to the right-of-way conferred by the Act. 
See Stuart, 277 U.S. at 354 (emphasis added); Baldwin, 103 U.S. at 430. The trial court 
properly so concluded and its judgment should be affirmed.6 
5
 Weiser argues that the trial court's refusal to admit the proffered evidence is reversible 
error. Op. Br. at 2, 4, 28, 31-32. However, "a trial court has broad discretion to 
determine whether proffered evidence is relevant, and [this Court] will find error in a 
relevancy ruling only if the trial court has abused its discretion. Additionally, an 
erroneous evidentiary ruling will lead to reversal only if, absent the error, there is a 
reasonable likelihood that there would have been a more favorable result for the 
defendant. A reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome exists when the 
appellate court's confidence in the verdict actually reached is undermined." State v. 
Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 780-81 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). The Court's confidence in the 
trial court's judgment in this case should not be undermined because the proffered 
evidence does not change the result. 
6
 Weiser argues that it was error for the trial court to reverse its prior summary judgment 
in favor of Weiser in response to Union Pacific's motion for reconsideration. Op. Br. at 
3, 7, 45. To the contrary, Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows "'a 
[trial] court to change its position with respect to any order or decision before a final 
judgment has been rendered in the case.'" U.P.C., Inc. v R.O.A. General, Inc., 990 P.2d 
945, 958 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (alteration in original) (quoting Trembly v. Mrs. Fields 
Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 1310 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)). 
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III. THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR DETERMINED THAT UTAH CENTRAL 
FULFILLED THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ACT AND UTAH CENTRAL ACQUIRED 
TITLE ON DECEMBER 15,1870 
Because the Secretary of the Interior found that Utah Central had complied with 
the requirements of the 1870 right-of-way grant, title to the disputed property passed to 
Utah Central as of the date of the Act, December 15, 1870. Accordingly, the trial court 
correctly entered judgment for Union Pacific, and this Court should affirm. 
A Utah Central complied with the requirements of the right-of-way Act 
The right-of-way Act required Utah Central to accept its terms and conditions and 
to file a map showing the location of the already-constructed railroad line. The Act 
required these steps to be taken within three months of passage of the Act, or by March 
15, 1871. To fulfill the requirements, Utah Central accepted the terms and conditions of 
the Act by letter to President Ulysses S. Grant, which he received by March 4, 1871. R. 
322, 328, 341. Likewise, on March 6, 1871, Utah Central transmitted to the Secretary of 
the Interior a profile map showing the line of the already-constructed railroad. R. 322, 
325-26. 
The right-of-way Act did not instruct Utah Central to file a certified profile map. 
It simply stated that "within three months from the passage of this act the said Utah 
Central Railroad Company shall file with the Secretary of the Interior a map to be 
approved by him, exhibiting the line of the railroad of said company, as the same has been 
located and constructed[.]" 16 Stat. 395 (attached as Add. A). Nevertheless, the 
Secretary of the Interior rejected the profile map because it was not certified. R. 325. 
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Three weeks later, the Secretary received a certified profile map from Utah Central, 
which he accepted on March 30, 1871. R. 339. 
S. Rejection of the timely-filed map did not result in a forfeiture 
Although Section 4 of the Act carried the penalty of forfeiture if Utah Central 
failed to accept its terms and conditions in the manner and by the deadline set, 16 Stat. 
395 § 4 ("if such acceptance and service shall not be so made, this grant shall be void"), 
the Act included no such penalty for failure timely to file a profile map. Moreover, courts 
have consistently rejected claims that noncompliance with the technical requirements of 
railroad land and right-of-way grants resulted in automatic forfeiture. For example, in 
Bybee v. Oregon & Central Railroad Co., the United States Supreme Court considered 
what consequence, if any, accompanied a railroad's failure to complete the road within 
the time limit set by the applicable acts of Congress. 139 U.S. 663, 673 (1891). The act 
in question stated that, if the railroad failed to complete the line within the time limit 
provided, "'this act shall be null and void, and all the lands not conveyed by patent to said 
company or companies, as the case may be, at the date of any such failure, shall revert to 
the United States '" Id. at 674 (quoting 14 Stat. 239 § 8). 
Even Congress's declaration that the act would be "null and void" was not 
interpreted by the Bybee court as requiring an automatic forfeiture, or even as providing 
grounds on which an individual could challenge railroad title to the right-of-way. Id. at 
676. Instead, the Court held that 
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'"no one can take advantage of the non-performance of a 
condition subsequent annexed to an estate in fee but the grantor 
or his heirs . . . ; and, if they do not see fit to assert their right to 
enforce a forfeiture on that ground, the title remains unimpaired 
in the grantee And the same doctrine obtains where the 
grant upon condition proceeds from the government; no 
individual can assail the title it has conveyed on the ground that 
the grantee has failed to perform the conditions annexed.'" 
Id. at 675 (citation omitted); accord Northern Pac. R. Co., Ill U.S. at 441 ('"failure to 
complete the road within the time limited is treated as a condition subsequent, not 
operating ipso facto as a revocation of the grant, but as authorizing the government itself 
to take advantage of it, and forfeit the grant by judicial proceedings, or by an act of 
Congress, resuming title to the land'" (citation omitted)); Central Pac. R. Co. v. Dyer, 5 
F. Cas. 364, 368 (D. Nev. 1871) (requirement to designate general route and file map "in 
no respect affected the grant of the right of way; it only furnished the means by which the 
secretary could withdraw the lands within a specified distance of such designated route 
from pre-emption, private entry and sale") 
Accordingly, '"lands granted by Congress to aid in the construction of railroads do 
not revert after a condition broken until a forfeiture has been asserted by the United 
States, either through judicial proceedings instituted under authority of law for that 
purpose, or through some legislative action legally equivalent to judgment of office found 
at common law.'" Northern Pac. Ry. Co., Ill U.S. at 441 (quoting St. Louis, I. M. & S. 
Ry. Co. v. McGee, 115 U.S. 469, 473 (1885)); Smith, 171 U.S. at 268 ("only the United 
States could complain of the act of the [railroad] company in changing the location of its 
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tracks from that previously selected"); Bybee, 139 U.S. at 675 (same). Thus, while 
Weiser argues otherwise, Op. Br. at 34, the United States Supreme Court has held that 
failure of a condition "ought not to be treated as a forfeiture, unless the language of the 
act be so clear and unambiguous as to admit of no other reasonable construction." Bybee, 
139 U.S. at 677. 
These cases are consistent with holdings of the United States Supreme Court that 
Congressional grants to railroads stand on a different footing than merely private grants, 
and should receive more liberal interpretations in favor of the governmental purposes for 
which they were passed. Leo Sheep, 440 U.S. at 683; Missouri, Kans., & Tex., 97 U.S. at 
497 ("It is always to be borne in mind in construing a congressional grant, that the act by 
which it is made is a law as well as a conveyance, and that such effect must be given to it 
as will carry out the intent of Congress."). Those important governmental purposes 
require that the quasi-judicial decisions of the Secretary of the Interior in granting railroad 
rights-of-way be protected from collateral attack. Van Wyck, 106 U.S. at 368-69 ("A 
third party cannot take upon himself to enforce conditions attached to the grant when the 
government does not complain of their breach." (citation omitted)); French v. Fyan, 93 
U.S. 169, 171 (1876) (holding that "action of the land-office in issuing a patent for any of 
the public land, subject to sale by pre-emption or otherwise, is conclusive"); Boise 
Cascade Corp. v. Union Pacific R. Co., 630 F.2d 720, 723 (10th Cir. 1980) ("The actions 
of the Secretary may not be reviewed in this collateral proceeding."); King v. McAndrews, 
111 F. 860, 864 (8th Cir. 1901) (holding that mistake of law or fact on issue department 
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had power and duty to decide is impervious to collateral attack); Union Pac. Land 
Resources Corp. v. Moench Inv. Co., Ltd., 696 F.2d 88, 91 (10th Cir. 1982) (holding that 
issuance of patent after administrative determination that lands were not mineral in 
character was final administrative decision conclusive against collateral attack); Rio 
Grande W. Ry. Co. v. Stringham, 110 P. 868, 871 (Utah 1910) (holding that state court 
was not proper forum and proceeding brought by adverse claimant was not proper 
proceeding in which to question Secretary of Interior's determination that railroad grant 
applied even though railroad built road only half as long as anticipated). 
This is true even when it is later alleged that the railroad acquired the benefit of an 
act through "fraudulent representations." Noble v. Union River Logging R. Co., 147 U.S. 
165, 172 (1893); accord French, 93 U.S. at 171-72. The Supreme Court gave a cogent 
rationale for this rule: 
[I]t would be a departure from sound principle, and contrary 
to well-considered judgments in this court, and in others of 
high authority, to permit the validity of [a] patent. . . to be 
subjected to the test of the verdict of a jury on such oral 
testimony as might be brought before it. It would be 
substituting the jury, or the court sitting as a jury, for the 
tribunal which Congress had provided to determine the 
question, and would be making a patent of the United States a 
cheap and unstable reliance as a title for lands which it 
purported to convey. 
Fre«cfc,93U.S.atl72. 
If the lands over which the right-of-way was granted were public lands, subject to 
the operation of the statute, "the question whether the plaintiff was entitled to the benefit 
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of the grant was one which it was competent for the secretary of the interior to decide . . . 
." Noble, 147 U.S. at 176. Therefore, Weiser's challenge to the 1870 right-of-way grant 
to Utah Central is misguided. Even if the certified profile map had been required by the 
Act, imposing forfeiture for a three-week delay in certifying a map would have been 
inconsistent with the purposes for which Congress passed the 1870 Act. Moreover, it 
would have worked a "harsh and unjust" result, as it would have left Utah Central with a 
constructed railroad, but no right-of-way. By bee, 139 U.S. at 677. 
Utah Central filed the original profile map in conformance with the Act. The 
Secretary of the Interior then imposed an additional requirement not found in the Act— 
that the profile map be certified. Utah Central complied with this extra-statutory 
requirement and the Secretary accepted the second, certified map. Further, the United 
States, which was aware that the railroad was already constructed and in operation, never 
sought a forfeiture. Accordingly, title passed to Utah Central as of the date of the Act and 
Weiser lacks standing to challenge this disposition of public lands made by the United 
States almost 140 years ago. 
IV. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AND THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
HAVE AFFIRMED THE VALIDITY OF THE 1870 RIGHT-OF-WAY GRANT TO 
UTAH CENTRAL 
The trial court's partial summary judgment to Union Pacific is supported by Utah 
Supreme Court and United States Supreme Court cases specifically affirming the validity 
of the right-of-way grant to Utah Central. Significantly, the Utah Supreme Court 
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determined in 1914 that the Act was properly accepted by Utah Central. In Salt Lake 
Investment Co. v. Oregon Short Line Railroad Co., the plaintiff sought compensation 
from the defendant railroad for the taking of private property for public use. 148 P. 439, 
440 (Utah 1914). Like Weiser's trace of title to Tomlinson, the plaintiff in Salt Lake 
Investment traced its title to an 1877 grant of property within the railroad's right-of-way. 
Id. at 442. The railroad counterclaimed, claiming title to the property under the very same 
Act at issue in this case. Id. at 440. 
The Utah Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs challenge to the railroad's title 
and affirmed the validity and effect of the Act. Id. at 444-45. Specifically, the court 
ruled that Utah Central had complied with the requirements of the Act: 
On December 15, 1870,. . . Congress granted to the 
Utah Central Railroad Company, for railroad purposes, "a 
right of way through the public lands * * * 200 feet in width 
on each side of said railroad where it may pass through the 
public domain," from a point at or near Ogden City to Salt 
Lake City, Utah Territory. The grant required acceptance and 
was accepted in February, 1871, at which time the Utah 
Central Railroad Company filed with the Secretary of the 
Interior its articles of incorporation and map showing the 
route of its road, etc. 
Id. at 443 (second omission in original; emphasis added). Because the disputed property 
was located within the federally granted right-of-way, the Utah Supreme Court concluded 
that the plaintiff had no claim to the property. Id. at 444-45. 
The plaintiff appealed to the United States Supreme Court. Salt Lake Inv. Co. v. 
Oregon Short Line R. Co., 246 U.S. 446 (1918). The High Court also confirmed the 
27 
validity of the right-of-way grant, expressly recognizing that it conveyed the right-of-way 
to Utah Central on December 15, 1870, the date the Act was passed. Id. at 447. 
Even before the Salt Lake Investment cases, the right-of-way grant to Utah Central 
had been judicially affirmed by the Utah Supreme Court. In Moon v. Salt Lake County, 
the court rejected an argument that the 1870 right-of-way grant ended at the legal 
boundary of Salt Lake City, excluding "the terminus of the railroad, which was then and 
is now located near the business portion and center of the city . . . . " 76 P. at 224, 224. 
The court held that 
The language of the act under consideration, the same as in 
other congressional acts of similar character and purpose, is in 
terms of a grant in presenti, and imports immediate transfer of 
interest, and segregation of the land embraced in the grant 
from the public domain. The grant itself, to the*extent of the 
land included therein, operated as a reservation to any patent, 
based upon subsequently acquired rights, issued for any 
portion of the public lands across which the right of way 
extends, even though no reservation may appear in express 
terms in such patent. 
Id. at 225. 
Thus, the United States Supreme Court and the Utah Supreme Court both have 
ruled that Congress's right-of-way grant to the Utah Central was a present grant that 
became effective on the date the Act was passed, December 15,1870. The trial court so 
ruled and the judgment should be affirmed. 
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V. STATE LAW CLAIMS ARE IRRELEVANT 
State law claims, statutory or common law, may not be employed to diminish a 
railroad's title, received by Congressional grant. The United States Supreme Court has 
repeatedly held as follows: 
"The courts of the United States will construe the grants of 
the general government without reference to the rules of 
construction adopted by the states for their grants; but 
whatever incidents or rights attach to the ownership of 
property conveyed by the government will be determined by 
the states, subject to the condition that their rules do not 
impair the efficacy of the grants or the use and enjoyment of 
the property by the grantee." 
Townsend, 190 U.S. at 270-71 (quoting Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661, 669 (1891)). The 
intent of Congress in granting lands to railroads "should not be defeated by applying to 
the grant the rules of the common law, which are properly applicable only to transfers 
between private parties.... But the rules of the common law must yield in this, as in all 
other cases, to the legislative will." Missouri, Kans. & Tex,, 97 U.S. at 497; Kindred v. 
Union Pac. R. Co., 168 F. 648, 653-54 (8th Cir. 1909) (right-of-way cannot be lost by 
laches or acquiescence, and possession by individuals does not ripen into title, regardless 
of lapse of time). 
In Boise Cascade, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals disposed of the plaintiffs 
claims of adverse possession, abandonment, estoppel, and boundary by acquiescence by 
stating, "[t]hese claims are all irrelevant." 630 F.2d at 724. The court elaborated: "[I]n 
granting the right of way Congress conclusively determined the strip covered was 
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necessary for an important public work " Id. "'The whole of the granted right of 
way must be presumed to be necessary for the purposes of the railroad, as against a claim 
by an individual of an exclusive right of possession for private purposes.'" Id. (quoting 
Townsend, 190 U.S. at 272). 
The Tenth Circuit also disposed of statutory challenges to railroad land grant title. 
In particular, the plaintiff in that case raised claims under Utah's bona fide purchaser 
statute, the Occupying Claimants Act, and the Marketable Record Title Act. Id. The 
Tenth Circuit ruled that "[i]t is enough to say that state law cannot operate to impair the 
efficacy' of a federal grant or vest title in someone other than the federal grantee." Id.; 
see also Great N. Ry. Co. v. Steinke, 261 U.S. 119, 132-33 (1923) ("neither laches on the 
part of the company nor any local statute of limitations can invest individuate with any 
interest in the tract, or with a right to use it for private purposes, without the sanction of 
the United States"). For these reasons, the trial court properly dismissed all of Weiser's 
state law claims, including his claims related to the 1935 quiet title action, and its ruling 
should be affirmed. 
VI. WEISER DOES NOT HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE SALE TO UTA, 
WHICH WAS PROPER IN ANY EVENT 
Although Utah Central's right-of-way grant was subject to "reverter in the event 
that the company ceased to use or retain the land for the purpose for which it was 
granted," Townsend, 190 U.S. at 271, reversion to the United States was not triggered by 
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Union Pacific's sale of the disputed property to UTA. First, the property was sold to 
UTA for the development of a regional commuter rail project. Consequently, the 
property will continue to be used "for the purpose for which it was granted"—railroad 
operations. Id. For this reason, the reversionary interest was not triggered. 
Second, federal law expressly permits the conveyance from Union Pacific to UTA: 
For the purposes of this title the consent of the United States 
is given to any railroad or canal company to convey to the 
State transportation department of any state, or its nominee, 
any part of its right-of-way or other property in that State 
acquired by grant from the United States. 
23 U.S.C. § 316. Union Pacific conveyed its right-of-way, which it acquired by grant 
from the United States, to UTA, the nominee of the State of Utah. The conveyance is 
expressly permitted by federal statute. 
Even if the reversionary interest were triggered by Union Pacific's sale to UTA, 
title would not vest in Weiser, but in the United States. As demonstrated above, the 
patent to Weiser's predecessor-in-interest, Tomlinson, from the United States in 1873 did 
not convey any interest in the disputed property, not even a reversionary interest, because 
the United States no longer had any interest to convey. The earlier 1870 right-of-way 
grant to Utah Central had removed the granted right-of-way from the inventory of public 
lands available for patent. Cf. Elder, 2007 UT 46, f 8, 164 P.3d 1238 (holding that 
disputed property was no longer public land on date of right-of-way grant because Nephi 
City had received patent to land in question three years earlier). 
31 
Therefore, Weiser does not hold an interest in the disputed property that would 
give him standing to challenge Union Pacific's sale to UTA. The trial court properly 
rejected Weiser's arguments on this point, and the judgment should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court properly ruled that Weiser's claim to the property could not be 
given effect because it arose after the date of the Act. First, Weiser failed to preserve the 
declaratory judgment issue for appeal. Second, Weiser's predecessor-in-interest did not 
pay the full price for his preemption claim until February 6, 1872, more than one year 
after the right-of-way Act was passed. 
Third, the trial court properly determined that the Secretary of the Interior 
approved Utah Central's certified profile map and that the United States, the only party 
with standing, never challenged Utah Central's compliance. Consequently, title to the 
disputed property passed to Utah Central on December 15, 1870, the date of the Act. 
Fourth, the trial court properly rejected all of Weiser's state law claims because 
state law cannot operate to impair a Congressional right-of-way grant. Finally, the trial 
court properly concluded that Union Pacific's sale of the disputed property to UTA did 
not effect a forfeiture. 
For these reasons, Union Pacific urges this Court to affirm the judgment entered 
below. 
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DATED this 11th day of February, 2009. 
Reha Deal 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee 
Union Pacific Railroad Company 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Elizabeth M. Peck 
422 North 300 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103-1217 
V 
y 
U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight 
Facsimile 
No Service 
U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight 
Facsimile 
No Service 
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Addendum A: 16 Stat. 395, December 15, 1870 
Addendum B: Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Summary Judgment 
Addendum C: Ruling on Motions for Summary Judgment Filed by the Parties 
Addendum D: Revised Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order and Judgment 
ADDENDUM A 
PUBLIC ACTS OF THE FORTY-FIRST CONGRESS 
Of TH« 
UNITED STATES, 
Passed at ike Third Session, which was begun and held at the City of 
Washington, in the District of Columbia, on Monday, the fifth day 
of December, A. D. 1870, and was adjourned without day on Saturday 
the fourth day of March, A. D. 1871. 
ULTMKS S. GRANT, President SCHUTLER COLFAX, Vice-President 
and President of the Senate. JAMES 6 . BLAINE, Speaker of the 
House of Representatives. 
CHAP. I. — An Act to enlarge ths Jurudidion of the probatt Courts in Idaho Territory. Doe. IS, 1170. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and Hoxtse ofRepresentatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled, That the probate courts of the Probata coarts 
Territory of Idaho, in their respective counties, in addition to their pro- ^ w t o k i to1* 
bate jurisdiction, be, and they are hereby, authorized to hear and deter- certain cMI and 
mine all civil causes wherein the damage or debt claimed does not or- criminal caaea; 
ceed the sura of five hundred dollars, exclusive of interest, and such 
criminal cases arising under the laws of the Territory as do not require 
the intervention of a grand jury: Provided, That they shall not have tatootiakad, 
jurisdiction in any matter in controversy, when the title, boundary, or cbanctrjr, or di-
right to the peaceable possession of land may be in dispute, or in chan- Torct *****' 
eery or divorce cases: And providedfurther, That in all cases an appeal Appeals. 
may be taken from any order, judgment, or decree of said probate courts 
to the district court 
SEC. 2. And be it farther enacted, That all acts and parts of acts in- Repealing 
consistent with this act are hereby repealed: Provided, That this act &****-
shall not affect any suit pending in the district courts of said Territory at Pending antta. 
the time of its passage. 
APPROVED, December 18,1870. 
CHAP. IL—4nAct grtaUmg to Cfo Utah Ctairal Bmbroad Companya Right of Waw Daa 16,1870. 
AmtgktUjn^LmdsJbrtUOmMtnK^wn 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled, That the right of way through Right of way 
the public lands be, and the same is hereby, granted to the Utah Central {JjX!*11 ?U^AL 
Railroad Company, a corporation created under the laws of the legislative Utah GSJtrai 
assembly of the Territory of Utah, its successor* and assigns, for the con- Ballroad Oom-
struction of a railroad and telegraph from a point at or near Ogden City, ffiSSSP* 
in the Territory of Utah, to Salt Lake CSty, m said Territory; and the ^ ^ ^ f 
rfcht, power, and authority is fare] hereby given to said corporation to 
take from the public lands adjacent to the line of said road material of material* for 
earth, stone, timber, and so forth, for the construction thereof. Said way •""Jj*11?* 
is granted to said railroad to the extent of two hundred feet in width on grant 
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each side of said railroad where it may pass through the public domain, 
including all necessary ground for station-buildings, work-shops, depot*, 
machine-shops, switches, side-tracks, turn-tables, and water-stations: Pro-
Compaayto vided, That within three months from the passage of this act the said 
S l ^ l L s l S ^ U t m n Ceit**1 Kai'road Company shall file with the Secretary of the In-
tarr of tit« In- terior a map to be approved by him, exhibiting the line of the railroad of 
ttrior within g^y company, as the same has been located and constructed: Provided 
fW«?£t£»Bs-/Mrt*ert That said company shall not charge the government higher 
poruuoa. rates than they do individuals for like transportation and telegraphic ser-
vice. And it shall be the duty of the Utah Central Railroad Company 
Running oon- to permit any other railroad, which has been or shall be authorized to be 
SS^otb*? built by the United States, or bv the legislature of the Territory of Utah, 
££u!ft. ° to ^rm running connections with its road on fair and equitable terms. 
Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, That the United States make 
Exprefi con- the grants herein, and that the said Utah Central Railroad Company 
f111^0^*^ accepts the same, upon the express condition that the said company 
fog grant6iP •ball not exercise the power given by section ten of chapter sixteen of the 
laws of the Territory of Utah, approved February nineteenth, eighteen 
Congrats ma/ hundred and sixty-nine; and upon the further express condition that 
wfort* coadi- |f fa ^JJ company make any breach of the conditions hereof, then in. 
°*' such case, at any time hereafter, the United States, by its Congress, may 
do any and all acts and things which may be needful and necessary for 
the enforcement of such conditions. 
Bailroad tobj SEC. 3. And be it further enacted, That said Utah Central Railroad 
JXSUTM^. shall be a post route and a military road, subject to the use of the United 
States for postal, military, naval, and all other government service, and 
also subject to such regulations as Congress may impose, restricting the 
charges for such government transportation. 
Aocaptaoet of SEC. 4. And be itfiirther enacted, That the acceptance of the terms, 
fri&bem™**1' «onditioo* a n d impoflitiona of this act, by the said Utah Central Railroad 
writing and la Company, shall be signified in writing nnder the corporate seal of said 
UTM month*, company, duly executed pursuant to the direction of its board of directors 
first had and obtained, which acceptance shall be made within three 
months alter the passage of (his act, and shall be served on the President 
of the United States; and if such acceptance and service shall not be so 
made, this grant shall be void. 
ActflMjbe SEC. 5. And be it further enacted, That Congress may at any time, 
altered, fto. having due regard for the rights of said Utah Central Railroad Company, 
add to, alter, amend, or repeal this act. 
APPROVED, December 15, 1870. 
Pec 15,1870. CHAP. IIL—An Act donating Ckattakoodm Annul to the State cf Florida fir 
r
 educational Purpomt, 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representative* of the United 
Chattaaooebes Statu of America in Congrets assembled, That the public property, 
WSSA^^S *° ^ k f h e P***0*** buildings, and appurtenances thereto belonging, situated 
eSowu pnT11" ^ Gadsden county, in the State of Florida, and known as the u Chatta-
hoochee Araenal," and at present occupied by said State as a peniten-
tiary, be, and the same are [is] hereby, granted and donated to the State 
of Florida for educational purposes. 
Sftoratsiy of SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That the Secretary of War is 
J^tomatstta hereby authorized and directed to transfer said property to the board of 
tnmftr, aiutto yJibemoi improvement of the State of Florida, to be held br«them in 
trust, for the use, benefit, and execution of the purpose of this grant, or 
for such other publie purposes as said board may deem proper. 
APPROVED, December u>- IMA. 
ADDENDUM B 
J. CLARE WILLIAMS, # 3490 
JEFFERY J. DEVASHRAYEE, #6209 
Attorneys for Defendant 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY 
280 South 400 West 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1151 
Telephone: (801) 595-3270 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GLENC.WEISER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 910749302 
Honorable Rodney S. Page 
The matter of Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration having come before the Honorable 
Rodney S. Page on July 31, 2001; Stephen W. Call appearing on behalf of Plaintiff and Jeffery J. 
Devashrayee appearing on behalf of Defendant; the Court having reviewed Defendant's Motion for 
Reconsideration, Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for 
Reconsideration and Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration, and having 
heard the arguments and representations of counsel; and being fully advised in the premises, hereby 
makes its findings of uncontro verted facts, conclusions of law and order of judgment: 
FINDINGS OF UNCONTROVERTED FACTS 
1. The Act of Congress of December 15, 1870 (16 Stat. 395) ("1870 Act") provides, 
among other things, as follows: 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled, that the right of 
way through the public lands be, and the same is hereby, granted to 
the Utah Central Railroad Company, a corporation created under the 
laws of the Legislative Assembly of the Territory of Utah, its 
successors and assigns, for the construction of the railroad and 
telegraph from a point at or near Ogden City, in the territory of Utah, 
to Salt Lake City, in said territory; . . . Said way is granted to said 
railroad to the extent of 200 feet in width on each side of said railroad 
where it may pass through the public domain . . . Provided, that 
within three months from the passage of this act the said Utah Central 
Railroad Company shall file with the Secretary of the Interior a map 
approved by him, exhibiting the line of the railroad of said company 
as the same has been located and constructed:... 
2. According to the 1870 Act, on December 15,1870, Congress granted to Defendant's 
predecessor in interest, Utah Central Railroad, for railways purposes, a right of way through the 
public lands to the extent of 200 feet in width on each of the track, from a point at or near Ogden to 
Salt Lake City, Utah territory. 
3. Utah Central Railroad began construction of the railroad line at Ogden on May 17, 
1869, and completed construction to Salt Lake City on January 10,1870. 
4. Utah Central Railroad's acceptance of the terms of the grant was submitted to the 
Secretary of the Interior on March 2, 187L 
5. On March 6, 1871, a profile map was filed with the office of the Secretary of the 
Interior by Utah Central Railroad. 
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6. The map was rejected by the Secretary of the Interior and returned to Utah Central 
Railroad on grounds that it was not certified. 
7. On March 30,1871, Utah Central Railroad resubmitted the profile map (presumably 
a certified map) which was duly accepted and approved by the Secretary of the Interior on that date. 
8. The Secretary of the Interior transmitted to Utah Central Railroad a "Certificate of 
Filing of Acceptance of Map" on June 26,1871. 
9. The United States Supreme Court in United States v. Northern Pac. R. Co.. 177 U.S. 
435 (1899), previously held that the alleged lapse of a land grant statue before the filing of a profile 
map or the construction of a line of railroad was a "condition subsequent" authorizing only the 
federal government to seek forfeiture of the railroad land grant for that purpose. 
10. The federal government has never asserted that the land grant made under the 1870 
Act lapsed because Utah Central Railroad did not timely file its profile map. 
11. The property to which Plaintiff claims title and which is the subject of this action (the 
"Property") is located in Davis County, near the Salt Lake County-Davis County line. All but an 
extremely small portion (approximately .045 acres) of the property lies within the boundary lines 
of the 400-foot land grant right of way. 
12. Plaintiff claims title to the Property under a patent that his predecessor in interest 
received from the United States Government on September 25,1875. 
13. The government patent specifically limits the property conveyed pursuant to the 
patent to those public "lands subject to sale" at the time of the patent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3 -
14. As early as 1904, only thirty-four (34) years after the grant of the property to Utah 
Central Railroad, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the validity and effect of the land grant made 
under the 1870 Act in an action to quiet title to certain property within the Salt lake City limits. 
Moon v. Salt Lake County. 76 P. 220 (Utah 1904). 
15. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the validity and affect of the same land grant ten 
years later in Salt Lake Inv. Co. v. Oregon Short Line R. Co.. 148 P.2d 439 (Utah 1914), holding that 
the railroad owned the property in question in accordance with the 1870 Act and that because such 
property was included or within the federal land grant right of way, the plaintiff had no claim to the 
property. 
16. The plaintiff in Salt Lake Inv. appealed the Utah Supreme Court's decision to the 
United States Supreme Court, which affirmed both the Utah Supreme Court's decision and the 
validity and effect of the same land grant, holding that the property in question was not subject to 
preemption by the plaintiff and that the plaintiff had no right, title or interest in the property. Salt 
Lake Inv. Co. v. Oregon Short Line R.R. Co.. 246 U.S. 446 (1918). 
17. Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure reads in part: 
(c) Affirmative defenses. In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party 
shall set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and 
award, assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in 
bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, 
illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches, license, payment, release, 
res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of limitations, waiver, and any 
other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense 
18.' Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in part: 
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(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief 
in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-
party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one 
is required.... 
* * * * 
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections 
not presented either by motion or by answer or reply, except (1) that 
the defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted, the defense of failure to join an indispensable party, and the 
objection of failure to state a legal defense to a claim may also be 
made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion for 
judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits . . . . 
18. Defendant has not plead the defense of statute of limitations as an affirmative defense 
pursuant to Rules 8(c) and 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based on the foregoing undisputed uncontroverted facts, the Court makes the following 
conclusions of law: 
1. Although Utah Central Railroad failed to file a certified map exhibiting the line of 
the railroad and approved by the Secretary of the Interior within three months of the passage of the 
1870 Act, the alleged lapse of a land grant under the 1870 Act before the filing of a certified profile 
map only authorizes the federal government to seek forfeiture of the railroad land grant. 
2. In holding that only the federal government can seek forfeiture of a railroad land grant 
if a land grant statute lapses because of late filing of a profile map, the United States Supreme Court 
in Northern Pac. explained: 
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Again, it is contended that when a statutory grant contains on the face 
of the law a provision that each and every grant, right and privilege 
are upon condition that the road shall be completed within a certain 
time, and that time expires without performance of the condition, all 
future proceedings of the company, even if acquiesced in and 
approved by executive officers of the Government, in disregard of the 
forfeiture, are unauthorized, ultra vires and forbidden. 
In other words, if we understand the position, it is claimed that under 
section 8 of the act of July 2, 1964, non-completion of the railroad 
within the time limited of itself operates as a forfeiture; the grant 
immediately reverts to the Government; and the courts must so hold 
on the simple statement of the fact of non-compliance within the 
limit. We do not understand this to be a correct statement of law. In 
Schulenberg v. Harriman, 21 Wall, 44, this court was called upon to 
consider the legal import of such a provision in the act of Congress 
of June 3,1856, granting public lands to the State of Wisconsin to aid 
in the construction of railroads in said State. After providing that the 
lands should be sold, from time to time, as the construction of the 
railroad progressed, until the road was completed, it was enacted that 
"if said road is not completed within ten years no further sales shall 
be made, and the lands unsold shall revert to the United States." 
No part of the road having been built at the expiration of the period 
limited in the grant, it was claimed that the lands reverted to the 
United States. It was held by the Circuit Court of the United States 
for the District of Minnesota that such lands did not ipso facto revert 
to the United States by mere failure to build the road within the 
period prescribed by Congress, and that no effect a forfeiture some 
act on the part of the government evincing an intention to take 
advantage of such failure was essential; and, on error, that ruling was 
affirmed by this court, and the following statement of the law was 
made by Mr. Justice Field in giving the opinion of the court: 
"In what manner the reserved right of the grantor for breach of the 
condition must be asserted so as to restore the estate, depends upon 
the character of the grant. If it be a private grant, that right must be 
asserted by entry or its equivalent. If the grant be a public one, it 
must be asserted by judicial proceedings* authorized by law, the 
equivalent of an inquest of office at common law, finding the fact of 
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forfeiture, and adjudging the restoration of the estate on that ground, 
or there must be some legislative assertion of ownership of the 
property for breach of condition, such as an act directing the 
possession and appropriating of the property, or that it be offered for 
sale or settlement. At common law the sovereign could not make an 
entry in person, and, therefore, an office found was necessary to 
determine the estate; but, as said by this court in a late case, {United 
States v. Repentigny, 5 Wall. 286), 'the mode of asserting or of 
resuming the forfeited grant is subject to the legislative authority of 
the Government. It may be after judicial investigation, or by taking 
possession directly under the authority of the government without 
these preliminary proceedings.' 
"In the present case no action has been taken either by legislative or 
judicial proceedings to enforce a forfeiture of the estate granted by 
the act of Congress. The title remains, therefore, in the State as 
completely as it existed on the day when the title by location of the 
route of the railroad acquired precision and became attached to the 
adjoining alternate sections." 
In July, 1866, Congress granted unto the California and Oregon 
Railroad Company a right of way over the public lands. In a 
subsequent suit between the railroad company and one Bybee, a 
holder of a mining claim, it was claimed that the railroad company 
had forfeited and lost its right under the grant by its failure to 
complete its road within the time limited in the act; that such failure 
operated ipso facto as a termination of all right to acquire any further 
interest in any lands not then patented. But it was held by this court, 
in the words of Mr. Justice Brown: "That in all cases in which the 
question has been passed upon by this court, the failure to complete 
the road within the time limited is treated as a condition subsequent, 
not operating ipso facto as a revocation of the grant, but as 
authorizing the government itself to take advantage of it, and forfeit 
the grant by judicial proceedings, or by an act of Congress, resuming 
title to the land." Schulenberg v. Harriman, 21 Wall. 44; Van Wyck 
v. Knevals, 106 U.S. 360, are then cited, and likewise St. Louis, & c.t 
Railroad Co. v. McGee, 115 U.S. 743, where it was said by Chief 
Justice Waite to have been often decided "that lands granted by 
Congress to aid in the' construction of railroads do not revert after 
condition broken until a forfeiture has been asserted by the United 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 7 -
States, either through judicial proceedings instituted under authority 
of law for that purpose, or through some legislative action legally 
equivalent to judgment of office found at common law." "Legislation 
to be sufficient must manifest an intention by Congress to reassert 
title and to resume possession. As it is to take the place of a suit by 
the United States to enforce a forfeiture, and judgment therein 
establishing the right, it should be direct, positive and free from all 
doubt or ambiguity." 
Northern Pac, 177 U.S. at 439-41. 
3. Because the land grant of 1870 was a public grant by the federal government, the 
federal government alone must assert by judicial proceedings authorized by law, the equivalent of 
an inquest of office at common law, finding the fact of forfeiture, and adjudging the restoration of 
the estate on that ground, or there must be some legislative assertion of ownership of the property 
for breach of condition, such as an act directing the appropriating of the property, or that it be offered 
for sale or settlement. 
4. Because the federal government has never asserted that the land grant of 1870 lapsed 
because Utah Central Railroad did not timely file its profile map, the federal government, regardless 
of Utah Central Railroad's late filing, accepted the profile map and recognized and made effective 
the land grant in Utah Central Railroad. 
5. Because the federal government accepted the filing of the profile map, and because 
the 1870 land grant of the right of way at issue was an inpraesenti grant to an already existing line 
of railroad, the right of way was granted to Utah Central Railroad effective December 15,1870, the 
date of the 1870 Act. Therefore, all requirements of the 1870 Act, as conditions subsequent, are 
irrelevant except as to challenge by the federal government. 
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6. The land grant of 1870 to Utah Central Railroad remains valid today except as to a 
challenge by the federal government. 
7. Because the Property is included within the land grant's right of way, Plaintiff has 
no valid claim to the Property. 
8. Title to the disputed Property received by Plaintiffs predecessor, by patent from the 
United States Government on September 25, 1875, is of no effect because it is subsequent to the 
effective date of the land grant. 
9. Plaintiffs claims to the Property are also barred under the doctrine of stare decisis, 
which is that once a point of law has been decided, that ruling should be followed by a court of the 
same or lower rank in subsequent cases concerning the same legal issue. Once the court of last resort 
makes a legal ruling, decisions on the same issue by courts of a lower rank are superseded. State v. 
Shoulderblade. 905 P.2d 289,291-92 (Utah 1995). 
10. The Utah Supreme Court previously recognized the validity of the land grant of 1870. 
The circumstances underlying the land grant and the general nature and purpose of the land grant 
evidence the validity and effect of the land grant: 
We have a right to assume that, at the time of the passage of the act, 
Congress was aware that the railroad had been constructed to the 
station in the city over public lands within the city limits. This, 
indeed, appears from the context, for it is provided that within three 
months from the passage of the act the railroad company shall file 
with the Secretary of the Interior a map showing the line of railroad, 
"as the same has been located and constructed": thus showing that 
the lawmakers had in mind the railroad as it was actually located 
The grant was not a mere gift to the Utah Central Railway Company, 
but was designed to promote the interest of the inhabitants of the two 
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cities, of the public at large, and of the general government, as well 
as those of the grantee That all such legislation by Congress was 
designed to enhance the interests of the government, as well as to aid 
such enterprises, is apparent from the terms of the various grants for 
railroad purposes. At the times when several acts in aid of inter 
mountain and transcontinental railroads were passed, there were yet 
immense tracts of public lands unsettled and uncultivated. 
Moon, 7 P. at 224-25. 
11. This Court must liberally construe the 1870 Act to effectuate Congress' intent 
regarding the subject land grant: 
In constructing acts making grants of such character, offering 
inducement to individuals or corporations to engage in such 
expensive quasi public enterprises, the courts will, without hesitation, 
look in to the condition of the country, the circumstances existing at 
the time of their passage, and the purposes to be accomplished, and 
will give such a construction as will carry out the designs of the 
lawmaking power. The inducements to those engaging in such 
enterprises are the right of way and the privileges relating to material 
for the construction of the road. In the interpretation of the language 
employed in granting such a right of way and such privileges, where 
the intention of the lawmaker is to subserve the public interest by 
aiding the enterprise, more liberality will be exercised than in case of 
a grant of a strictly private character; and this with a view to 
effectuate the object of Congress. "The acts making the grants," says 
Mr. Justice Field, "are to receive such a construction as will carry out 
the intent of Congress, however difficult if might be to give full effect 
to the language used if the grants were by instruments of private 
conveyance. To ascertain that intent, we must look to the condition 
of the country when the acts were passed, as well as to the purpose 
declared on their face, and read all parts of them together." Winona 
& St Peter R.R. Co. v. Barney, 113 U.S. 618,5 Sup.Ct. 606,28 L.Ed. 
1109. In United States v. Denver, etc. Railway, 150 U.S. 1, 14 
Sup.Ct. 11,37 L.Ed. 975, Mr. Justice Jackson, delivering the opinion 
of the court said: "When an act, operating as a general law, and 
manifesting clearly the intention of Congress to secure public 
advantages or to subserve the public interest and welfare by means of 
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benefits, more or less valuable, offers to individuals or to 
corporations an inducement under take and accomplish great and 
expensive enterprises or works of a quasi public character in or 
through an immense and undeveloped public domain, such legislation 
stands upon a somewhat different footing from merely a private grant, 
and should receive at the hands of the court a more liberal 
construction in favor of the purposes for which it was enacted." 
United States v. Chaplin, 31 Fed. 890; Railroad v. Baldwin, 103 U.S. 
426, 26 L.Ed. 5787. 
H. at 225. 
12. This Court recognizes the immediate transfer of interest to the Property to Utah 
Central Railroad under the 1870 Act consistent with the Utah Supreme Court's determination in 
Moon: 
The language of the act under consideration, the same as in other 
congressional acts of similar character and purpose, is in terms of a 
grant in praesenti, and imports immediate transfer of interest, and 
segregation of the land embraced in the grant from the public domain. 
The grant itself, to the extent of the land included therein, operated as 
a reservation to any patent, based upon subsequently acquainted 
rights, issued for any portion of the public lands across which the 
right of way extends, even through no reservation may appear in 
express terms in such patent. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Townsend, 
190 U.S. 267, 23 Sup.Ct. 671, 47 L.Ed. 1044; Railroad Co. v. 
Baldwin, 103 U.S. 426, 26 L.Ed. 578. 
Id. 
13. Consistent with the Utah Supreme Court's holding in Salt Lake Inv. Co. v. Oregon 
Short Line R. Co., supra, this Court recognizes Defendant's compliance with the 1870 Act's 
requirements: 
On December 15, 1870, . . . Congress "granted to the Utah Central 
Railroad Company, for railroad purposes, "a right of way through the 
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public lands *** 200 feet in width on each side of said railroad where 
it may pass through the public domain," from a point at or near 
Ogden City to Salt Lake City, Utah Territory. The grant required 
acceptance and was accepted in February, 1871, at which time the 
Utah Central Railroad Company filed with the Secretary of the 
Interior its articles of incorporation and map showing the route of its 
road, etc. 
Salt Lake Inv. Co.. 148 P.2d at 443. 
14. Like the Property in this case, the property in Salt Lake Inv. was included or within 
the land grant's right of way. Therefore, this Court, like the Utah Supreme Court in Salt Lake Inv.. 
recognizes the validity and effect of the Act and concludes that Plaintiff has no claim to the Property. 
15. In the appeal in Salt Lake Inv.. the United States Supreme Court confirmed the 
validity of the land grant, explaining that the property was "the subject of conflicting claims - one 
under a patent to Malcolm MacDuff issued under the Pre-Emption Act, c. 16 Stat. 453, and the other 
under an act, chapter 2, 16 Stat. 395, granting a right of way 'through the public lands' to the Utah 
Central Railroad Company." Salt Lake Inv.. 246 U.S. at 446-47. Because the right of way was an 
inpraesenti grant to an already existing line of railroad, and because Utah Central Raihoad had, in 
fact, made a timely acceptance of the grant, the court explicitly recognized that the right of way had 
been granted effective December 15,1870, the date of the Act. Id. at 447; Northern Pac. 177 U.S. 
at 439-41. 
16. Like the plaintiff in Salt Lake Inv.. Plaintiffs claim to the Property is an "impossible 
one" as if he were making no claim to it at all: 
[W]e'think MacDuff settlement and declaratory statement under the 
pre-emption act were of no effect. They neither conferred any right 
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on him nor took any from the government. His claim was not merely 
irregular or imperfect, but was an impossible one under the law, and 
so the status of the land was not affected thereby. The land continued 
to be subject to the disposal of congress and came within the terms of 
the right of way as much as if he were making no claim to it Of 
course, the presence on public land of a mere squatter does not 
exempt it from the operation of such an act containing, as here, no 
excepting clause. 
Id. at 449. 
17. The cases cited and relied on by Plaintiff, to wit: Gately v. Massachusetts. 2 F.3d 
1221 (5th Or. 1993); Lee v. Insurance Co. of North America. 763 P.2d 567 (Haw. 1988); Young v. 
Northern Terminals. Inc.. 290 A.2d 186 (Vt. 1972); and In Re Kina's Estate. 268 N.Y.2d 131 (N.Y. 
1966), are not applicable because none of these cases are United States Supreme Court or Utah 
Supreme Court cases or involves the application or interpretation of an Act of Congress. Further, 
the legal issues in the instant case are subject to the legal determinations of both the United States 
Supreme Court and the Utah Supreme Court affirming the validity and effect of the land grant, which 
determinations are no less authoritative now than they were in the 1900rs when they were made and 
are not subject to interpretation or change by another court regardless of the facts that Plaintiff relies 
on in support of his claim to the Property. 
18. Defendant has waived any statute of limitations defense by failing to assert such an 
affirmative defense in its Answer. 
ORDER OF JUDGMENT 
Based on the foregoing uncontroverted facts and conclusions of law, it is hereby 
ORDERED, that Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration is hereby granted; and it is further 
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ORDERED, that the Court's Ruling on Plaintiffs and Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment filed February 24,1995, is hereby reversed; and it is further 
ORDERED, that the Court's Third Amended Partial Summary Judgment ("Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law") filed September 6, 1995, is hereby reversed; and it is further 
ORDERED, that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted. 
DATED this day of October, 2001. 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorable Rodney S. Page 
District Court Judge 
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I hereby certify that on the of October, 2001, a copy of the foregoing was served 
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Steven W. Call, Esq. 
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ADDENDUM C 
SECOND DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF 
COUNTY OF DAVIS, FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT 
FILLJ 
JUL 0 8 2005 
. .SECOND . 
ILJTAWSTRICT COURT 
\ 
GLEN C WEISER, an individual 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation 
Defendant 
RULING ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT FILED BY THE PARTIES 
Case No. 910749302 PR 
Judge: Rodney S. Page 
This case has been before the Court for a number of years and has been the 
subject of numerous motions and hearings between the parties, including two 
interlocutory appeals to the Utah Supreme Court, which were rejected. 
Most recently, the matter was before the Court on February 22, 2005 on motions 
and cross-motions for summary judgment on the various remaining issues. Following 
the hearing, the Court took the matter under advisement based upon the stipulation of 
counsel that they would submit to the Court a set of stipulated facts from which the 
Court could decide the issue of the location of the center line of the right-of-way, a 
central issue in the case. 
At this time, no stipulated facts have been presented to the Court, and therefore 
the Court will proceed to rule upon those issues before it based upon the 
memorandums and arguments previously submitted. 
On October 1, 2001, this Court entered its findings and judgment on defendant's 
reconsidered motion for summary judgment. In that ruling the Court found that, by act snjfft 
fthe 
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of congress of December 15, 1870, the Utah Central Railroad, defendants predecessor 
in Interest, was granted a right-of-way through the public lands to the extent of 200 feet 
wide on each side of the road from a point near Ogden City to Salt Lake City. 
Further, the Court determined that the patent of land in question to George 
Tomlinson in 1873, plaintiffs predecessor in interest, to the extent that it was included 
in the right-of-way, granted to the Railroad in 1870, was a nullity. The reason being that 
the land which was part of the 1870 grant to the Railroad was taken out of the public 
land subject to preemption and sale, and therefore the Land Department was without 
authority to convey any rights therein. Northern Pacific vs Townsend 190 U.S. 267; 23 
S. CT. 671 (1903). 
As a result of this Court's prior ruling, the only issues left for determination are: 1) 
the location of the right-of-way; 2) the nature of the legal rights conveyed to defendant 
in the grant; 3) the effect of the District Court's decree quieting title in the land, plaintiffs 
predecessor in interest in 1935; 4) plaintiffs challenge to the conveyance of the right-of-
way to the UTA by the defendant; 5) the question of trespass and damages related 
thereto in the event defendant is occupying land of the plaintiff not covered by the right-
of-way; and 6) the question of sanctions. 
As to the question of the exact location of the right-of-way grant, absent the 
stipulation of facts by the parties, the Court concludes that there are factual disputes 
which preclude the Court from deciding that issue at this time. 
Concerning the nature of the legal rights conveyed to the defendant in the grant, 
this Court has already determined that the patent issued to plaintiffs predecessor in 
1873 was a nullity; however, to clarify the Court's ruling in that regard, this Court would 
2 
conclude that the Railroad was granted a limited fee interest subject only to reverter to 
the Federal government should the Railroad fail to use the land for the purpose 
specified in the grant. Northern Pacific vs Townsend, supra; Great Northern Railway 
Co. vs United States 315 U.S. 262, 62 S. CT 529 (1942). 
It is important to note, as stated in the Townsend Case, the nature of the 
property interest in land conveyed by grant from congress changed after 1871, and 
from then on was only considered to be an easement and not a fee interest. 
Given the nature of the title held by the Railroad in the right-of-way, the question 
remains as to what, if any, the effect the State District Court decree quieting title in 
plaintiff's predecessor in interest has on the right-of-way grant. 
This Court would conclude that no action under State law has the ability to limit 
or circumscribe the rights granted under the 1870 act, with the exception of the exercise 
of limited state police power. 
That would include State court decrees quieting title and various other State 
legal theories such as adverse possession or The Marketable Record Title Act. 
Townsend supra: Boise Cascade Corp. vs Union Pacific Railroad Co., 650 F.2d 720, 
(10th Cir. 1980), cert, denied, 450 U.S. 995 (1981). Even assuming that defendant had 
been made a party to the quiet title action, a fact that is in dispute, the decree could not 
have altered or taken away from the nature of the grant to the Railroad in this case. 
Given the Court's ruling as to the nature of the legal titled conveyed by the grant, 
it is clear that any legal rights which may remain in the right-of-way over and above 
those belonging to the Railroad, belong to the Federal government exclusively. 
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Given the fact that plaintiff has no legal interest in the right-of-way, he has no 
legal standing to challenge the transfer of the right-of-way to the Utah Transit Authority. 
However, even assuming that plaintiff had standing, he has no basis to challenge the 
transfer here. 
Federal law specifically grants to the Railroad the right to transfer to the 
Department of Transportation of any state, or its nominee, any part of the right-of-way 
or its property to be used for a similar purpose. 23 United States Code, Section 316. 
Emphasis added. 
Here the Utah Transit Authority is a nominee of the Utah State Department of 
Transportation and received title to the right-of-way under agreement with the 
defendant, dated January 16, 2002 to be used for commuter rail. 
Even assuming however, that the transfer was not in keeping with Federal law, 
given the Court's above ruling, only the Federal government, as owner of the 
reversionary interest, would have standing to challenge it. 
For the purpose of the record it should be noted that the Utah Transit Authority 
has agreed the defendant should continue to pursue this matter on their behalf and that 
UTA would be bound by any decision rendered herein. 
The Court next turns to the question of sanctions, if any, that should be 
considered by the Court. Each of the parties herein have filed motions for sanctions 
against the other. The Court has considered these motions and the memorandums 
and arguments submitted in support thereof and in opposition thereto, and being fully 
advised in the premises, rules as follows: 
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This Court initially granted plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue 
of the validity of the 1870 grant on the rationale that defendant's predecessors in 
interest failed to comply with the map filing requirements of the 1870 grant. 
Subsequent thereto, defendant filed a motion requesting the Court reconsider its 
ruling based on decisions of the Utah Supreme Court in the Moon Case and the Salt 
,ake Investments Case, decided in 1904 and 1914 respectively. Each of these cases 
vas directly in point and were cases in which our Supreme Court specifically upheld the 
alidity of the 1870 grant to Utah Central Railroad. Moon vs Salt Lake City, 76 P. 222 
JT 1904); Salt Lake Investment vs Oregon Shortline Railroad Company. 148 P. 439 
JT 1914), affd., 246 U.S. 446 (1918). 
Neither defendant, to whose arguments these cases were directly in point, nor 
aintiff cited either of these cases in their memorandums or argument to the Court on 
> question of the validity of the 1870 grant. Obviously both of these cases had been 
:ided long before this issue came before the Court. 
Given the relevance of the cases to the issue before the Court, the Court granted 
sndant's Motion for Reconsideration on condition that defendant pay to the plaintiff 
sum of $2,000 to cover reasonable expenses incurred to research, resubmit and 
gue the Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The matter was resubmitted and reargued and the Court modified its prior ruling 
id upon these cases, and upheld the validity of the 1870 grant. 
Subsequent to that time, both parties had submitted motions for sanctions 
ist the other. Plaintiff claiming that defendant violated Rule 11 by failing to 
jately research and argue the case before the Court; and defendant against the 
5 
plaintiff for failing to find these cases before their action was filed, and filling their action 
without proper investigation. 
After reviewing the circumstances and the memorandum submitted by counsel, 
the Court concludes that the two cases which were not cited by the defendant in its 
memorandum or arguments on the original motion were relatively old cases, and as 
such, were not readily discoverable through the ordinary means of legal research. The 
Court concludes that defendant's failure to cite or argue these cases originally was not 
the result of its failure to engage in reasonable inquiry or for the purposes of delaying or 
hindering the plaintiff, therefore the defendant's actions in that regard do not rise to the 
level that would justify sanctions under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The Court does find however, that there was good cause to require defendant to pay 
the $2,000 to the plaintiff to cover costs incurred by plaintiff to research and resubmit its 
memorandum on the reconsidered motion. 
As to the defendant's motion for sanctions against plaintiff for pursuing the 
various causes of action against defendant without reasonable inquiry, the Court 
concludes that the causes of action alleged by plaintiff are reasonable under the 
present status of the law or under nonfrivolous arguments for extension, modification, 
or reversal of existing law, or the establishment of new law, and therefore defendant's 
request for sanctions is hereby denied. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court reserves the question of the location of the 
right-of-way and any questions as to trespass or damages in the event the right-of-way 
does not cover all of the property claimed by the plaintiff. 
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Counsel are instructed to contact the Court's clerk to set a scheduling 
conference in order to resolve the remaining issues before the Court within fifteen days 
of the date of this ruling. 
Dated this &**• day of July, AD 2005 
BY THE COURT: 
Rodney S.^age | o / .  
District Court Judge 
74: 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing ruling to: 
Steve W. Call 
36 South Main Street, #1400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Jeffery J. Devashrayee 
280 South 400 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
postage prepaid this <f¥r day of July, AD 2005. 
Alyson Brown 
Clerk of Court 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GLEN C. WEISER, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendant. 
[revised] 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 910749302PR 
Hon. Rodney S. Page 
The Court having considered the various proceedings previously conducted by the Court 
and the Court's-prior rulings in the case and having further considered that all issues'before the 
I Or 
VD24051554 pages: 
Court have been heretofore resolved or adjudicated, the Court hereby makes its findings of fact, 
5 
* conclusions of law and order and judgment as follows: 
•r 
| FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
S 1. This long enduring case arises from an action that was filed by Glen C. Weiser 
(hereinafter the "Plaintiff or "Weiser") against defendant Union Pacific Railroad Company 
(hereinafter "Union Pacific" or "Railroad") regarding a parcel of land located in Davis County, 
Utah near the Salt Lake County line (hereinafter the "Property"). 
2. A brief history of the case is given by the Supreme Court in Weiser v. Union 
Pacific R. Co., 932 P.2d 596 (Utah 1997), which provides, in part, as follows. "In 1873, 
Weiser's most remote predecessor in interest purportedly received title to the disputed land 
through a federal land grant patent issued by President Ulysses S. Grant. In 1935, the district 
court for Davis County quieted title to the disputed property in Roelof Steenblik, one of Weiser's 
predecessors in interest. All known entities with a possible claim to the property were made 
parties to that action. The Raihoad was not made a party because there was no public record of 
its interest. The Railroad did receive constructive notice by publication, however." Id. at 597. 
3. " In 1982, Union Pacific began construction of a semi-truck loading facility on the 
disputed property. In 1987, Weiser discovered the Railroad's use of the property and through 
counsel requested the Railroad to surrender and vacate the property. The Raihoad refused, and 
Weiser had Associated Title Company prepare a title report, which showed that Weiser owned 
the property in fee simple. He again made a formal demand that the Raihoad surrender and 
2 
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vacate the property. Union Pacific again refused. Plaintiff brought this action to gain possession 
V> 
»» 
% of and to quiet title to the property." Id. at 597. 
§ 4. Union Pacific defended the action "contending that the United States had granted 
^ its predecessor in interest, Utah Central Railroad, a 400-foot-wide "right-of-way through public 
lands for the construction of a railroad and telegraph" in March of 1870. One of the conditions 
of the grant was that within three months after the passage of the 1870 Act, the Railroad file with 
the Secretary of Interior a map approved by him "exhibiting the line of said company, as the 
same has been located and constructed." The parties dispute whether this condition was fulfilled. 
Weiser contends that because the Railroad did not timely file a certified map that was accepted 
by the Secretary of Interior, the Railroads grant of right-of-way fails, [footnote omitted]. After 
extensive research and historical analysis, the trial court granted a partial summary judgment that 
the grant to the Railroad failed for lack of condition." Id. at 597. 
5. Through extensive summary judgment proceedings, the Court determined that the 
following facts relating to the parties' controversy were undisputed. 
(a) The Act of Congress of December 15,1870 (16 Stat. 395) (hereinafter "1870 Act"), 
which is relevant in this matter, provides among other things as follows: 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of 
America in Congress assembled, that the right of way through the public lands be, and 
the same is hereby, granted to the Utah Central Railroad Company, a corporation created 
under the laws of the Legislative Assembly of the Territory of Utah, its successors and 
assigns, for the construction of a railroad and telegraph from a point at or near Ogden 
City, in the territory of Utah, to Salt Lake City, in said territory; ... Said way is granted to 
said railroad to the extent of 200 feet in width on each side of said railroad where it may 
pass through the public domain ... Provided, that within three months from the passage 
of this act the said'Utah Central Railroad 'Company shail file with the Secretary of the 
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Interior a map approved by him, exhibiting the line of the railroad of such company as 
the same has been located and constructed: ... 
16 Stat. 395 (December 15, 1870). 
(b) The conditional 200 foot right of way grant pursuant to the 1870 Act would overlap 
substantially all of plaintiff s property (hereinafter "Property") which is the subject of this action. 
(c) On March 7, 1871, a profile map was filed with the office of the Secretary of the 
Interior by the Utah Central Railroad. Defendant Union Pacific Railroad is a successor in 
interest to the Utah Central Railroad. 
(d) On the following day, the map was rejected by the Secretary of the Interior and 
returned to the Utah Central Railroad on grounds that it was not certified. 
(e) On March 30, 1871, the Utah Central Railroad resubmitted the profile map 
(presumably a certified map) which was duly accepted by the Secretary of the Interior on that 
date. 
(f) The Utah Central Railroad failed to file a certified map with the Secretary of the 
Interior within the time limitation set by Congress in the 1870 Act. 
(g) In exchange for consideration, plaintiffs predecessors in interest received title to 
the Property by patent from the United States Government on September 25, 187[3] [sic]. 
(j) Plaintiffs chain of title in the Property appears on the record of the Davis County 
Recorder in which county the Property is situated. 
(k) A right-of-way grant to the Utah Central Railroad, which is at issue in this case, 
does not appear on any of the plat maps recorded in the Davis County Recorder's Office. 
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(1) Plaintiff and his predecessors in interest have paid the property taxes on the 
% Property for at least the past 25 years. 
2 (m) Defendant made its first improvements and enclosures on the Property when it 
.w commenced the construction of the TOFC facility in 1982. 
(n) There is a disputed question of fact whether defendant Union Pacific Railroad 
and/or its predecessor's have paid property taxes on the property. 
6. The Court granted Weiser's motion for partial summary judgment pertaining to 
the land grant issue in 1995. The Railroad filed a motion for reconsideration. The motion was 
denied. Thereafter, an appeal was pursued by the Railroad which was later dismissed by the 
Supreme Court. On October 19, 2000, the Railroad filed a motion for reconsideration. Weiser 
objected to the motion as untimely and improper. The Court determined that it would consider 
the motion. 
7. Upon considering the Railroad's motion, the Court determined that despite its 
prior granting of partial summary judgment in favor of Weiser, the doctrine of stare decisis 
required the Court to alter its prior ruling in the case.1 The Court concluded that it was 
compelled under the doctrine of stare decisis to change its decision despite the fact that the 
undisputed facts reflected that the Utah Central Railroad had failed to comply with the 
Conditional Grant. In making its decision the Court acknowledged that Weiser was not a party 
to any of the decisions cited by the Court and was not afforded an opportunity to present 
evidence or raise issues in those cases. 
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8. The Court rejected Weiser's arguments that the Court should have analyzed the 
issues in the case under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel and that neither 
doctrine was binding upon Weiser in this case. Based upon the Court's legal reasoning, the 
Court reversed its prior summary judgment made in favor of Weiser and granted the Railroad's 
motion for partial summary judgment in its October 1, 2001 ruling. 
9. Based upon the Courts' amended ruling that the Conditional Grant was valid, the 
Court addressed the character of the Grant. The Grant provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America 
in Congress assembled, That the right of way through the public lands be, and the same is 
hereby, granted to the Utah Central Railroad Company, a corporation created under the 
laws of the legislative assembly of the Territory of Utah, its successors and assigns, for 
the construction of a railroad and telegraph from a point at or near Ogden City, in the 
Territory of Utah, to Salt Lake City, in said Territory; and the right, power, and authority 
is hereby given to said corporation to take from the public lands adjacent to the line of 
said road material of earth, stone, timber, and so forth, for the construction thereof. Said 
way is granted to said railroad to the extent of two hundred feet in width on each side of 
said railroad where it may pass through the public domain,... 
10. The Court then concluded that the foregoing conveyance conveyed a fee or 
limited fee interest in the Property to the Railroad and Weiser has no remaining interest in the 
Property. The Court rejected Weiser's argument that the Conditional Grant conveyed only a 
right-of-way to the Utah Central Railroad. Consequently, the Court concluded that the subject 
Property was owned by the Railroad. 
The Court also concluded that Weiser lacked standing to challenge the Grant. 
' There was only a small part of the Property that was outside of the 400 foot right-of-way and the parties have 
settled any claim thereto. 
6 
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11. However, the Court concluded that the Property was in fact part of the "public 
% 
% lands" at the time of the Conditional Grant was approved by Congress. In making the foregoing 
f 
| determination the Court rejected Weiser's argument that the Property was not taken out of the 
® public lands because Weiser's original predecessor (Tomlinson) had acquired a homestead or 
pre-emption interest in the property. Weiser contended that Tomlinson's interest in the property 
was superior to the Railroad's because Tomlinson presented his Declaratory Statement of Pre-
emption on April 17,1869 before the Conditional Grant was approved by Congress and therefore 
the Property was not part of the "public lands" at the time Congress approved the Conditional 
Grant. Weiser contended that his position was supported by case authority. The Court rejected 
Weiser's arguments and concluded that the period of time for perfecting an interest in Property 
through the doctrine of pre-emption is determined by the date that the final proof of pre-emption 
was completed on July 6,1872 and not on April 17, 1869 when Tomlinson's Declaratory 
Statement of Pre-emption was made. Because the Court concluded that the date of proof is the 
controlling date for the purpose of determining when whether the Property was part of the public 
lands, the Court determined that the evidence proffered by Weiser at an evidentiary hearing that 
Tomlinson Declaration Statement was made on the public record on April 17, 1869 (before the 
Conditional Grant was approved by Congress) was irrelevant. 
12. The Court also concluded that the Decree Quieting Title made in favor of 
Weiser's predecessor by the Fourth District Court is not dispositive or binding upon this Court's 
determination that the Property belongs to the Railroad because no action under state law has the 
ability to limit or circumscribe land rights granted to the Railroad. In making this determination 
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the Court rejected Weiser's argument that the Decree Quieting Title to the Property made by the 
honorable Judge Pratt in 1935 is binding and enforceable under the doctrines of res judicata and 
collateral estoppel because the Railroad had no interest of record in the County Recorder and 
because the Railroad received constructive notice of the quiet title action by means of publication. 
13. The Court has also concluded that the conveyance of its interest in the Property to 
another did not cause the Property to revert to Weiser. The Court also rejected the argument 
raised by Weiser that defendant Union Pacific intended to remise or release its interest in the 
Property when it quitclaimed its interest in the Property to another and rejects the assertion that 
the conveyance of its interest by quitclaim deed was conclusive evidence. Weiser contended that 
if the conveyance of the Property was a limited fee conveyance, the limited fee was made subject 
to reverter to the United States and thereafter passed to Weiser through his chain of title 
stemming back to the original land patent given to Tomlinson. 
14. The Court has determined that the Railroad did not obtain any interest in the 
Property by way of adverse possession because it did not satisfy the requirements needed to 
establish a claim of adverse possession and that its ownership interest in the Property is based 
solely upon the Conditional Grant. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Based upon the foregoing findings and conclusions made by the Court and the prior 
proceedings in the case, the Court makes and enters its order and judgment as follows: 
ORDERED that defendant Union Pacific Railroad received a limited fee interest in the 
Property pursuant to the Conditional Grant; 
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ORDERED that defendant Union Pacific Railroad's limited fee did not revert back to the 
United States and then transfer forward to Weiser when Union Pacific Railroad purported to 
convey its purported interest to another; 
ORDERED that Weiser's claims for relief as alleged in his complaint including his 
claims to quiet title, restitution, forcible detainer, treble damages, trespass and unjust enrichment 
are hereby dismissed with prejudice; 
ORDERED that defendant Union Pacific Railroad's alleged defense of adverse 
possession is also dismissed for cause; and 
ORDERED that this Judgment is final as to the matters ruled upon and shall be entered 
by the Clerk of the Court without further delay, the Court having determined that all claims 
between the parties in this case have now been adjudicated. 
DATED this 3)sY~day o f l ^ ^ W 2007. 
BY THE COURT: 
District Court Judge 
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